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ABSTRACT 
 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a novel concept. Adopted in 2005, it nevertheless 
attracted ample controversy within a short span of time. The present Secretary General of the 
United Nations is committed to see R2P in action. R2P is still a concept and is yet to be fully 
understood and developed. Its scope and limits are not clear yet. It has both supporters and 
critics. Supporters of R2P see it as a doctrine--an emerging norm, a revolutionary concept in 
international law; while critics argue that it reinforces humanitarian intervention and is a threat to 
national sovereignty-a new means of colonialism. R2P is deeply rooted in the already existing 
international legal system. It in fact, strengthens sovereignty. It does reinforce humanitarian 
intervention using force only under the auspices of the Security Council and condemns unilateral 
intervention. Security Council is the key player as it is vested with the responsibility to ensure 
international peace and security. The thesis analyses the role of the Security Council in putting 
R2P into action and suggests methods that the Council should consider. 
 
German Translation 
“Responsibility to Protect“ (R2P) ist ein neuartiges Konzept. Erst 2005 ins Leben gerufen, 
hat es dennoch bereits innerhalb dieser kurzen Zeitspanne zahlreiche Kontroversen 
hervorgerufen. Der amtierende Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen engagiert sich, um R2P 
umzusetzen. R2P ist immer noch ein Konzept und muss erst voll durchdacht und entwickelt 
werden. Der Wirkungsbereich und die Grenzen des Konzepts sind noch nicht klar. Es hat sowohl 
Unterstützer als auch Kritiker. Unterstützer von R2P sehen es als Doktrin – eine in Entstehung 
begriffene Norm, als ein revolutionäres Konzept im internationalen Recht; Kritiker hingegen 
argumentieren, dass dadurch humanitäre Interventionen bestärkt werden und es eine Bedrohung 
der nationalen Souveränität darstellt – ein neues Instrument des Kolonialismus. R2P ist 
allerdings im schon bestehenden System des internationalen Rechts tief verwurzelt. Tatsächlich 
stärkt es die Souveränität. Es unterstützt humanitäre Interventionen, in denen militärische Mittel 
nur unter der Leitung des Sicherheitsrats eingesetzt werden und missbilligt unilaterale 
Interventionen. Der Sicherheitsrat ist der Hauptakteur, da er die Verantwortung hat, Frieden und 
Sicherheit international zu garantieren. Die vorliegende Masterarbeit analysiert die Rolle des 
Sicherheitsrats bei der Umsetzung von R2P und zeigt Methoden auf, welche der Rat beachten 
sollte. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Today, the responsibility to protect is a concept, not yet a policy; an aspiration, not 
yet a reality. Curbing mass atrocities will be neither easy nor quick. There is no certain 
blueprint for getting the job done. We are all novices in this field.”   
United Nations Secy. Gen. Ban Ki Moon, Berlin, July 15, 2008 
Responsibility to Protect has become a buzz word in the field of human rights today. 
Since its adoption it has rejuvenated our hopes for world with better human rights. However, it 
continues to face many challenges; to see it in action is the real challenge for the United Nations 
(U.N.). One could think that the future of R2P is uncertain by looking at the manner the events 
unfolded in Darfur. The situation in Darfur is challenging the basic tenets of the UN principles 
adopted under the UN Charter and the international legal and human rights system. In the 
discourse on sovereignty, humanitarian intervention using force haunts like an evil at a time 
when there is a need to provide help to people who need it the most. The challenges posed by the 
geo-politics, further, preclude us from taking dynamic steps forward.  
 
Many supporters perceive Responsibility to Protect as a timely doctrine that would help 
re-haul the existing UN system without changing it much. Nevertheless, five years since its 
adoption, many are still arguing if there is a need for it. Lack of clarity has led many to question 
its scope and application. Many say that the doctrine hinders nations from taking actions or 
breaches the basic tenets of international law by allowing intervention in a state’s internal 
matters. The debate on the subject is not clear. Responsibility to Protect is a part of soft law as it 
has been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly Resolution. If successfully 
implemented, R2P could help the United Nations in preventing genocides, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and mass atrocities from taking place.  
 
In fact, the United Nations was established in response to the tragic events of the Second 
World War that shook the conscience of our common humanity. It has been estimated that nearly 
50 million people were killed1; millions of others were wounded or went missing during the war. 
                                                 
1 http://warchronicle.com/numbers/WWII/deaths.htm 
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20 to 30 million civilians had been killed, the majority through the holocaust, forced labour and 
concentration camps, acts of revenge, deportation and displacement.2 The horrors of Nazi 
Holocaust united the world to wrestle against such events and to avert similar horrors in the 
future. The heads of the states in 1945 came together to establish the United Nations to fulfil this 
purpose. Since then, the newly independent states started to look at UN for global membership 
and recognition. They considered UN as a platform to give voice to their concerns and its 
membership increased gradually over the years.  The UN Charter lays down the fundamental 
rules which every nation undertakes to oblige as a respectful member of the international 
community. 
 
The Preamble of the UN Charter begins with the following determination, “We the 
peoples of the United Nations determined to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”3 With regard to human 
rights the Preamble of the UN Charter sets forth, “faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women.”4 One of the 
main purposes of the United Nations, as article 1(3) provides is, “…to achieve international 
cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”5 Thus, a look at the 
Charter and the working of the UN during the last six decades show us that, ever since its 
establishment, human rights have been at the centre of its work.  
 
The establishment of the United Nations signifies the responsibility shared by the world 
community to protect human rights, to maintain international peace and security in the world and 
to restrain states from acts of aggression. UN is the right place for providing the right institutions 
to achieve these goals. As Ekkard Strauss observes, “The UN Charter reflects awareness of the 
interrelationship between the respect for human rights and international peace and security. It 
contains not only institutions setting provisions, but establishes fundamental norms for the 
                                                 
2 See Ekkehard Strauss, The Emperor's New Clothes?: The United Nations and the Implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect (Nomos, 2009). Pg 18 
3 See Preamble, Charter of the UN, Para 1available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml 
4 Id. Para 2, 
5 See Article 1 para 3, Charter of the UN, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 
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behaviour of states in their International Relations.”6 
 
United Nations plays a pivotal role in the world affairs. It is a focal point for global 
security issues, a world forum for debate, a network for developing universal norms and 
standards, and a vehicle for administering humanitarian assistance around the world.7 It is based 
on the principles of national sovereignty, non intervention in the internal affairs of states and of 
friendly relations and cooperation among states. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter specifies that, 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.”8 The only exceptions are the actions taken by the 
Security Council under its Chapter VII powers and actions taken by a country in its right to self 
defense during an event of armed attack as specified under Article 51 of the UN Charter.9  
 
Sovereignty, the founding principle of the UN, is a cherished norm. The principle of non 
intervention which is limited to matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
States is another cardinal principle. States for many years have guarded these two principles. As 
Michel Flower and Julie Mari Bunck state, “Many governments consider the principle of non 
intervention a defense against the threats and pressures from former colonial powers and their 
allies.”10 Today, globalization has drastically changed the world we live in. Matters within the 
limit of a state have international effects and cease to be matters exclusively within its 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the nature of wars has dynamically changed during the twentieth 
century. From wars between the states it has become wars within the states and often states are 
perpetrators of human rights violations. Intractability of these wars forced UN to forge into this 
area. Primarily established for peace and security concerns, UN is now more concerned with 
human security issues within the states. Nevertheless, national sovereignty posits a great 
challenge. 
                                                 
6 See Supra note 2 
7 See Jean D. Krasno, The UN Landscape: An Overview, The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a 
Global Society, Ed. By Jean E. Krasno, 2004, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder, London, pg 3  
8 Supra note 5 See Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
9 Id. See Article 51of the UN Charter 
10 See Michael Flower and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and 
Application of the Concept of sovereignty, Penn State Press, 1995 
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Recent developments in international law suggest that state sovereignty no more signifies 
immunity from interference but rather imposes strict responsibility on the state to protect its 
citizens. There are global standards that states should adhere to and UN is the only organization 
in the world that can set globally accepted standards and norms of behavior. Through UN, we 
have a strong international human rights law developed through treaties and covenants which the 
member states are obliged to implement in their domestic fields. This branch of international law 
has been ever growing to meet the demands of the 21st century and the demands of the 
individuals.  
 
After the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was immediately 
adopted. It came into force in 1948. This convention has been described as the quintessential 
human rights treaty.11 It made genocide a punishable crime. Genocide is defined as, “…acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious 
group. These acts include; killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group, imposing conditions on the group calculated to destroy it, preventing 
births within the group; and forcibly transferring the children from the group to another group.”12  
It has been labeled as the crime of crimes and is often described as the most heinous crime. 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute also provides the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the 
jurisdiction with respect to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crimes of 
aggression.  
 
 Thus, according to the international treaties, human rights have become the core and ever 
more important. States can no more escape for the wrongs they commit on their citizens under 
the pretext of sovereignty. Impunity is no longer a luxury and Universal jurisdiction has been 
adopted in certain treaties. Pinochet case stands as an example. The recent case of the indictment 
                                                 
11 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Ninth Session, 12 May-18 July 1997, 
UN Doc A/52/10 para 76, cited in William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Third 
Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007, at pg 92 
12 Article 6, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://www.un.org/icc/romestat.htm 
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of Al Bashir by the International Criminal Court shows further development in this field of law. 
It is for the first time that a sitting President has been indicted for human rights violations.  
 
In the 21st century protection of the rights of the individual has taken a centre stage. The 
establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and more recently the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
highlight further developments in this regard. These developments point out that the world 
community will not stand as bystanders in the event of mass violations of human rights such as 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes and if such crimes ever take 
place international community will do its best to halt them and bring the perpetrators to justice. 
As David Matas observes, “Today, through United Nations resolutions, declarations, conventions 
and covenants, we have a body of international law of human rights. There are protocols or 
optional protocols that recognize the status of individuals. The instruments that have developed 
have served to chop away at the doctrine that protecting human rights is an intervention in the 
domestic affairs.”13 
 
However, despite such major developments, treaties, conventions and affirmations, 
twentieth century has experienced many untold challenges. The world has witnessed major 
humanitarian crisis in different parts of the world. For example, the Cambodian horrors during 
1975-79 claimed two million lives.14 800,000 men, women and children were killed in just few 
weeks during the Rwandan genocide.15 Between 1992-95, nearly 200,000 people were killed in 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide.16 The Kosovo episode displaced nearly 400,000 people during 
1998-99.17 The Security Council (SC) did not interfere during the Cambodian genocide. During  
the Rwandan episode, the Security Council passed a resolution withdrawing the UN troops 
despite the availability of information. The Security Council stood standstill when the Kosovo 
                                                 
13 See David Matas, No More: The Battle Against Human Rights Violations, Dundum Press Ltd., 1994, pg 166 
14 See Pol Pot in Cambodia, The History Place, Genocide in the 20th century available at 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/pol-pot.htm 
15 Id. Rwanda 1994 
16 Id. Bosnia- Herzegivona 1992-95 
17 By Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Kosovo: Lessons From the Crisis, Crown 2008, 
available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/31AA374E-C3CB-40CC-BFC6-
C8D6A73330F5/0/kosovo_lessons.pdf 
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issue was at its table. UN and the Security Council were heavily criticized for their failure to 
fulfill their promise to stop such crimes.  
 
NATO’s action in Kosovo bypassed the SC’s authority and posed serious questions to the 
international legal order. Similarly, war on Iraq questioned the humanitarian motives of big 
powers when intervening in weaker states and questioned the legitimacy of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention? Questions were raised as to whether there is a right called right to 
intervention? Kofi Annan, the former Secy. Gen., often called the member countries to unite to 
stop genocides, mass atrocities and other crimes against humanity from taking place. In 1999 the 
Secy. General in his speech to the General Assembly questioned, “If humanitarian intervention 
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Sebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”18 He repeatedly said that sovereignty entails responsibility and asked the 
international community to forge a consensus in this regard.  
 
Interestingly in 2005, the world leaders came together and unanimously adopted the UN 
resolution on Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Through R2P, countries have pledged to act in a 
timely manner to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.19 It clearly said that the fundamental responsibility to protect lies with the 
sovereign himself. The responsibility shifts to international community only when the state 
concerned is a part or is manifestly failing to prevent crimes against humanity. The doctrine 
embraces three core responsibilities namely-- responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. The 
doctrine emerged as a result of both international failure to act in Rwanda and international 
action in Kosovo.  
 
Rwandan genocide was considered the worst and fastest ever genocide where the 
international community failed to act, especially the Security Council. During Kosovo, NATO 
                                                 
18 Former Secy. Gen., Kofi Annan, Millennium Report 2000, available at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf at pg 48 
19See generally the UN World Summit Resolution, 2005 A/RES/60/1, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021752.pdf 
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acted but without a proper SC authorization. The Kosovo Commission headed by Richard 
Goldstone and Carl Tham concluded that NATO’s intervention was illegal but legitimate.20  The 
Kosovo episode threw open challenges to the international system, especially, the effects of 
bypassing UNSC and further deepened the debate on humanitarian intervention. Scholars 
questioned “the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the 
damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.”21 
What should be done when the Security Council is in a deadlock? Who matters the most, the 
people or the powerful five? It is to these questions that R2P attempts to answer. It reaffirms our 
moral and ethical believes to protect strangers. Few scholars see R2P as an historic achievement 
for human rights and consider it an international norm or doctrine; others see it as a threat to 
national sovereignty. Critics of R2P attack the notion arguing that it’s a western idea to interfere 
in the internal matters of weak states and that R2P is just another name for humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
Since its inception, R2P, loomed into controversies and has generated considerable 
debate and a compelling body of research.  One of the major developments regarding research on 
R2P has been the establishment of research institutes such as the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, the International 
Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect, the R2P Coalition and the Asia-Pacific Center for 
Responsibility to Protect. Many other international organizations and NGOs are strongly 
involved in addressing and advocating this doctrine. R2P rightly interpreted and properly put into 
practice could help us prevent mass atrocities. There is a need to understand R2P for the 
purposes for which it was conceived, to keep its meaning narrow and achieve its objective which 
is to prevent genocides and other mass atrocities.   
 
R2P faces three main challenges namely: conceptual challenges, institutional challenges 
                                                 
20SEE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, 
INTERNATIONALRESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED, OXFORD, 2000 
21 Simon Chesterman, Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of 
Law, 33 Security Dialogue, 293 (2002)  
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and political challenges.22 R2P can be effectively implemented when these challenges are 
successfully addressed. The present Secy. General Ban Ki Moon is committed to see R2P in 
action. Security Council is a key player and is the first port of call for any kind of intervention. 
The most important question the thesis seeks to address is: Whose responsibility is to protect and 
in this regard what is the role of the Security Council? It is very important to analyze the role of 
the Security Council in order to address the three core challenges that R2P faces. The point here 
is to develop a mechanism that could actually help the Security Council in taking a decision.  
 
The thesis is divided into five main parts. The first part outlines a brief history of the 
emergence of R2P. It charts the various phases of the development of the R2P doctrine before it 
was finally adopted. It gives a brief overview of various phases from the point of its conception 
to adoption. The second part conceptualizes R2P and clarifies many misunderstandings 
surrounding it. In this part, its meaning and its scope of application is clarified by analyzing if 
R2P is a threat to sovereignty, and if R2P is another name for humanitarian intervention as critics 
argue. I further analyze if R2P is based on already existing international legal system and if R2P 
is an emerging norm as claimed by the supporters of R2P. It analyzes the main aspects of R2P 
and finds out what is novel about it. The third part of the thesis deals exclusively with the 
Security Council and analyzes the responsibility of the Security Council with respect to human 
rights protection. It critically analyzes the Council’s spurt in action and attitude in the nineties. In 
the fourth part various methods existing within the UN mechanism are suggested and analyzed 
that could assist the Council to concretely arrive at decisions.  Finally, in the fifth part the thesis 
concludes its findings and suggests how the Security Council can act better and take up a more 
proactive role in order to improve its credibility in the international system. Thus, the thesis 
presents a timely discussion on R2P and addresses an area of compelling intellectual interest.  
 
                                                 
22 See Rebecca Hamiliton, The Responsibility to Protect, From Document to Doctrine. What of 
Implementation? 19 Harvard Law Journal, 289-297 
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BIRTH OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
After the Kosovo episode and the war on Iraq, the international community was losing 
confidence in UN and questions about the credibility of the Security Council arose. The best way 
forward was to create a doctrine that would turn the whole debate and appeal to everyone. The 
challenges posed by the debates on humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty were clearly 
articulated by Kofi Annan. In 1999 the former Secy. Gen., Kofi Annan in his speech to the 
General Assembly questioned, “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault 
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Sebrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”23 Again, the 
Secy. Gen., in his 2000 report to the General Assembly challenged the international community 
to try to forge consensus around the basic questions of principle and process involved: when 
should intervention occur, under whose authority, and how.24 In response to his question, the 
Canadian Government, on the initiative of the foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, sponsored the 
establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2000. 
 
A. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), sponsored by 
the Canadian government, was co –chaired by Gareth Evans from Australia and Mohamed 
Shahnoun from Algeria and consisted of members who are experts in their respective areas. The 
Commission was asked to wrestle with the whole range of questions - legal, moral, operational 
and political - rolled up in this debate, to consult with the widest possible range of opinions 
around the world, and to bring back a report that would help the Secretary-General and everyone 
else find some new common ground.25 The Commission came up with its report within a year in 
2001 which concluded after intensive research, worldwide consultations and deliberations and 
produced a 90 page report and a 400 page supplementary volume which compiled the 
                                                 
23Former Secy. Gen., Kofi Annan, Millennium Report 2000, available at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf at pg 48 
24 www.vmpeace.org/pages/international_law_responsibility_to_protect.htm 
25 See Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, December 2001, available at  http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp 
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Commission’s research essays, bibliography and back ground material.26  
 
The main theme of the Commission’s report was “Responsibility to Protect”. In its report, the 
Commission propagated the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.27 Thus, the Commission 
steered the whole debate about humanitarian intervention into a new direction. Instead of 
debating intervention, the Commission stressed upon responsibility. It clearly stated that state 
sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people 
lies with the state itself. It said that when a population is suffering from serious harm as a result 
of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the responsibility shifts to the broader international community. 
 
 The Commission with its report rewrote the definition of sovereignty in the contemporary 
time. It relied and borrowed the concept, ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, heavily from the work 
of Francis Deng and his colleagues who believed, “sovereignty should no longer be seen as a 
protection against external interference in a state’s internal affairs. Rather, the state must be held 
accountable to domestic and external constituencies.”28 They augmented that, “living up to the 
responsibilities of sovereignty becomes in effect the best guarantee of sovereignty. Governments 
could best avoid intervention by meeting their obligations not only to other states, but also to 
their own citizens. If they failed, they might invite intervention.”29 The Commission reinforced 
this concept in its report.  
 
Furthermore, the Commission stated that the foundations of the responsibility to protect are 
deeply rooted and found in the obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty, the 
responsibility of the Security Council under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, specific legal obligations under human rights and human 
                                                 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 See Deng and et. al, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C. 1996 
29 Id. At pg. 15 
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protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law, 
and finally in the developing practice of the states, regional organizations and the Security 
Council itself.30 The Commission was serious about intervention as well. It laid down that for an 
intervention to be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human 
beings, or imminently likely to occur, or should involve large scale loss of life.31 The 
Commission identified three main elements associated with responsibility to protect, namely: 
responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. With respect to 
military intervention the Commission noted major principles such as; the just cause threshold 
principle, the precautionary principle, right authority and outlined operational principles.32 The 
Commission noted that military interventions for humanitarian purposes should be used as an 
exceptional and extraordinary measure. The Commission stressed on the preventive aspect as the 
single most important dimension of R2P.  
 
The report made considerable contribution.  Firstly it invented a new way of talking about 
humanitarian intervention. Gareth Evans said that the Commission sought to turn the whole 
weary- and increasingly ugly- debate about the right to intervene and re characterize it not as an 
argument about the right of states to do anything but rather about their responsibility. Secondly it 
insisted upon a new way of talking about sovereignty, thirdly it clearly spelled out what 
responsibility to protect means, and finally it provided guidelines for military intervention.33 The 
Commission and its report generated quite a discussion at various levels. The Commission 
should be applauded for the gigantic task that it accomplished. However, the efforts of the 
Commission have not been incorporated in the UN system and the report remains as a reference 
document. However, although the Commission was not commissioned by the UN itself, the UN 
has recognized the work and gave life to the concept in its successive deliberations.  
 
 
                                                 
30 Supra note 25 ICISS report 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All, Brookings 
Institution, 2008 
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B. United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004 
 
In order to meet the new and evolving challenges, and to strengthen the United Nations, 
Secy. Gen. Kofi Annan created the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change on 3rd 
November 2003. The mandate of the panel was to assess current threats to international peace 
and security, to evaluate how well the existing policies and institutions have done in addressing 
those threats, and to recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations to provide collective 
security for the 21st century. After a year long effort, the panel officially delivered a 141 page 
report titled “A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility” on 2nd December 2004.  The 
panel’s report was far more wide-ranging in scope than the ICISS report. It followed a human 
security approach that linked together poverty, disease, and environmental degradation with 
conflict both within and between states, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and transnational organized crime. Thus, it had more substance, coherence, and surpassed 
expectations.34  
 
With respect to Responsibility to Protect the panel said, “The Panel endorses the emerging 
norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security 
Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large 
scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign 
governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”35 The panel further recommended 
the five basic criteria of legitimacy for the use of force, drawing very directly from the language 
in the ICISS report. The panel also highlighted in its recommendation that the “task is not to find 
alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better 
than it has.”36 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 See Id at pg 44 
35 See High Level Panel Report, A More Secured World, Our Shared Responsibility, United Nations, 2004, 
available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/core-rtop 
documents?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=102 
36 Id.  
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C. In Larger Freedom; Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 2005 
 
In 2005, in his report the Secy. Gen. Kofi Annan obliged states saying that, “While I am well 
aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that 
we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it.”37 In his 
statement to the General Assembly the Secy. Gen. asked the international community to 
“embrace the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, as a basis for collective action against 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – recognising that this responsibility lies 
first and foremost with each individual state, but also that, if national authorities are unable or 
unwilling to protect their citizens, the responsibility then shifts to the international community; 
and that, in the last resort, the United Nations Security Council may take enforcement action 
according to the Charter.”38 
 
D. World Summit 2005 
 
The World Summit was convened to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the UN in 
September 2005 and was attended by the heads of the states of more than 150 states. Many 
propositions were put forward for consideration, R2P being one. Not all but R2P proposal 
survived in the summit outcome. The whole Summit proved to be a major disappointment to all 
those who hoped that it would result in a major overhaul of the UN system and global policy. 
But, remarkably the Secy. Gen’s R2P recommendation (although not his proposals for agreed 
criteria to govern the use of force) survived almost unscathed, with the final summit outcome 
document devoting special section to it.39 The Summit adopted the following three paragraphs 
with respect to responsibility to protect:40  
 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
                                                 
37Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards, Development, Security and Human Rights For 
All, General Assembly 59th Session, A/59/2005, March 21, 2005 available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement 
38 Id.  
39 Supra note 33, Gareth Evans at pg 47 
40 See generally, the World Summit Outcome document, UN GA Resolution 60/1available at http://daccess‐
dds‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 
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crimes against humanity  
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility 
entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 
Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which 
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on 
the Prevention of Genocide. 
 
Thus, the heads of the states unanimously adopted this doctrine and further recognized the 
special role of the office of the Special Adviser of the Secy. Gen. on the prevention of Genocide 
and gave a new boost to all those who were eagerly waiting for a new world order. Even though 
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all the recommendations were not adopted the adoption of R2P was momentous.  
 
E. Security Council Resolutions:  
i.  The UNSC Resolution 1674 (2006) 
 
On 28th April 2006, the Security Council through a thematic resolution on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, “reaffirmed” paragraphs 138 and 139 of the world summit document. 
Para 4 of the document states, “Reaffirms the provisions of the paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
2005 world summit document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”41  
ii. The UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006) 
 
On 31st August 2006, calling for the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur, the Security 
Council applied the R2P principle to a particular context for the first time. It said, “Recalling also 
its previous resolutions and 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms 
inter alia the provisions of the paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005, UN World Summit 
Document.”42  
 
F. Implementing Responsibility to Protect, 2009 
 
Ban Ki Moon, on 12th Jan 2009, in his report entitled “Implementing Responsibility to 
Protect” said that, “Based on the existing International law, agreed at the highest level and 
endorsed by both General Assembly and the Security Council, the provisions of paragraphs 138 
and 139 of the Summit Outcome define the authoritative framework within which member states, 
regional arrangements and the United Nations system and its partners can seek to give a 
doctrinal, policy and institutional life to responsibility to protect.43 The task ahead, he said, is not 
                                                 
41See Security Council 1674, S/RES/1674(2006) available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement 
42See Security Council Resolution 1706, S/RES/1706(2006) available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/484/64/PDF/N0648464.pdf?OpenElement  
43 Secy. Gen. Ban Ki Moon’s Report, Implementing The Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/63/677 available 
at http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf 
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to interpret or renegotiate the conclusions of the world summit but to find ways of implementing 
its decisions in a fully faithful and consistent manner.44 The Secy. Gen. outlined a three pillar 
strategy for advancing the agenda. Pillar one is the enduring responsibility of the state to protect 
its populations, pillar two is the commitment of the international community to assist states in 
meeting those obligations and pillar three is the responsibility of member states to respond 
collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a state is manifestly failing to provide such 
protection.45 The Secy. Gen. urged that unless all three pillars are strong the edifice could 
implode and collapse.46 He stated that all three must be ready to be utilized at any point, as there 
is no set sequence for moving from one to another, especially in a strategy of early and flexible 
response.47 
 
G.   Resolution 63/308, Adopted 25th September, 2009 
 
The resolution reaffirmed the member states respect for the principles and purposes of the 
Charter of the United Nations. It recalled the 2005 World Summit Outcome, especially, 
paragraphs 138 and 139. It took note of the report of the Secy. Gen. and of the timely and 
productive debate organized by the President of the General Assembly on the Responsibility to 
Protect, held on 21, 23, 24 and 28 July 2009, with full participation of the member states and 
decided to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect.48  
 
H. Conclusion 
 
These developments clearly show that the world is concerned about it. The adoption of 
Responsibility to Protect has been considered a historic achievement for human rights, where 
states pledged together to take action against human rights violations against reluctant states. The 
R2P would definitely bring in a new order. R2P hopes to encourage the Security Council by 
showing a confidence in it in order to maintain the international system instead of meeting the 
                                                 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48See GA Resolution 63/ 308 adopted on 25th September, 2009 available at  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/513/38/PDF/N0951338.pdf?OpenElement 
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old fate that League of Nations met before it collapsed. R2P documents clearly state that the 
Security Council is a key player.  The permanent five members (P5) have the power and 
resources to use to protect human rights across the world. The Security Council is the only 
institution that we have today that can legitimately advance the cause of human rights. The 
member states are willing to accept Security Council resolutions provided its motivations are 
clear and uniform. Security Council should bring back the picture that it gave to the world in 
1945 as the principal protector of international peace and security. In this respect it is very 
important to conceptualize the doctrine and understand its scope and application.   
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CONCEPTUALIZING RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
I. Scope and Application 
 
It has been five years, since, the adoption of R2P. The nature, scope, tools and emerging state 
practice of R2P are still debated in civil society and among member states.49 The concept of R2P 
is relatively new and, despite its endorsement at the 2005 world summit it is still fragile.50 The 
R2P debate tends to focus on sovereignty as the R2P is not exclusively about the relation 
between the states it is also about individuals and their place in international order.51 Today, the 
individual is considered a subject of international law.52 The new R2P terminology means that 
the emphasis is on those who are suffering and in need of support and on the duty of others to 
protect such victims.53 According to the ICISS report, it reflects two main priorities, First, 
“Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect; second it is 
important that less intrusive and coercive measures be considered before more coercive and 
intrusive ones.”54 
 
R2P is founded on three pillars: 1) the responsibility of the state to protect its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and from their 
incitements; 2) the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting these 
obligations; and 3) the responsibility of the member states to respond in a timely and decisive 
manner when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.55  As Edward C. Luck 
observes, “the UN members are united in their support for the goals of R2P but less so on how to 
                                                 
49 See Edward C. Luck, The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect, The Stanley Foundation, Policy 
analysis brief, August 2008 at pg 5 
50 See Responsibility to Protect, Address by Patricia O’Brien, Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs, The 
Legal Counsel, United Nations Torino Retreat 2008 
51 Id. 
52See Rein A. Mullerson, Human Rights and Individual as a Subject of International Law, 1 EJIL (1990) 33, 
“the individual is appearing more frequently with an active role in the implementation and enforcement of human 
rights standards rather than a passive beneficiary of rights and freedoms guaranteed by states in accordance with 
international norms.” 
53 See Thomas G. Weiss, Chapter 10, The Responsibility to Protect: Costs, benefits and Quandaries,  in The 
Military- Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect, 2nd Ed, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publications Inc. Oxford, 2005 pg 200 
54 Id. Also See Supra note 25 ICISS report 
55 Supra note 49, Edward C. Luck 
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achieve them.”56  
 
Today, R2P faces interpretation problems. More problems relate to the scope of its 
application. There are attempts to invoke R2P to new crimes and situations beyond what the 
states agreed during the 2005 world summit. Many others do not understand the concept and thus 
apply it even to problems like HIV/AIDS or other natural disasters. The idea of forced 
intervention in Myanmar to protect the population from the effects of a natural disaster is one 
such difficult case. Critics of R2P relate it to legitimizing military interventions in the world. 
Idealists say a more accurate name for the concept would be Right to intervene.57 The recent 
appeals to R2P in connection to the Georgia conflict and Cylone Nargis have highlighted the 
problem of interpreting R2P too widely. Such application might weaken the concept. Eli 
Stemmes says, “By invoking the principle in contexts that are well beyond those outlined in the 
World Summit outcome document, false expectations as well as false fears may be created, and 
the popular and political support of the principle may well in turn be challenged.”58 She further 
observes that, “In addition to the political force stemming from its affirmation by the world’s 
state leaders in 2005, the assumed exclusivity of the R2P principle is its greatest asset.”59 The 
fact that it is to be applied in connection to the extreme and extraordinary cases is what gives it 
added value compared to already existing international legal obligations and instruments and if 
R2P is to be applied to everything then the R2P label could become meaningless.60 Therefore, 
the scope should remain narrow and be tied to the four crimes. 
 
Some developing and emerging countries raised two main concerns: the “Trojans” feared that 
R2P is a Trojan horse, or the divisive humanitarian interventions of the 1990’s in disguise, 
opening the door for interest driven interventions by imperial or neo -colonial powers. Leading 
countries especially, in the global south such as Egypt, Iran, Cuba, Pakistan, Venezuela and 
China raised concerns over the potential to abuse R2P to legitimize interventions. The 
                                                 
56 Id.  
57See The Idea Whose Time has Come -and Gone? The Economist available at 
www.economist.com/displyStory.efm?story_id=14087788 
58 See Eli Stemmes, Operationalising the Preventive Aspects of the Responsibility to Protect, NUPI Report, 
No.1 -2008 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
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westaphalians raised more fundamental concerns over the weakening of sovereignty and the 
structure of the world order.61 
 
R2P offers a conceptual framework that could bring the individual and human rights at the 
heart of UN’s work as an active defender of human rights. R2P is a model with prevention as its 
basis. If properly understood and applied, it may assist in breaking a cycle of human rights 
violations and conflict. This it does by placing on both the state and international community. 
The foundations of R2P are firmly placed in existing international law- international 
humanitarian law, human rights law, international criminal law and the UN Charter itself.62 
 
J. Sovereignty as Responsibility 
 
Sovereignty,63 is a nation’s right to exercise its highest authority over its territory, is the 
corner stone of international relations. It gives the state to make authoritative decisions regarding 
the people and resources within its territorial boundaries. The United Nations is based on the 
principle of sovereign equality of its members64 and precludes any intervention in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.65 The only exceptions being an action by 
the Security Council or a state acts in self defense. Sovereignty is a cherished norm treasured by 
every nation either self made or born out of independence struggles from their colonizers. It 
nevertheless, raises many important legal, political and ethical dilemmas.66 The Kosovo conflict 
                                                 
61 See Marc Saxer, The Politics of Responsibility to Protect, Dialogue on Globalization, FES Briefing Paper 2 | 
April 2008, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05313-20080414.pdf at pg 3 
62 Supra note 50, Address by Patricia O’Brien 
63 There are four kinds as identified by Stephen D. Krasner, domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization 
of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority; 
interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to control transborder movements; 
international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states or other entities; and westaphalian 
sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations. Stephen D. 
Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey,  1999 pg 9  
64 See Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members” 
65 See Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.” 
66 See Preface to International Intervention Sovereignty vs Responsibility, Ed. Micheal Keren and Donald 
A.Sylva, Franck Cass, London, 2002,  “National Sovereignty, defined as a nation’s right to exercise its own law and 
practice over its territory, is a cherished norm in the modern era, and yet it raises legal, political and ethical 
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and the war on Iraq have prompted a debate of worldwide importance. Central to the discussion 
is the question: Are nations justified in violating sovereignty by intervening in other nation’s 
affairs in the name of responsibility for the protection of persecuted minorities?67 Sovereignty 
poses many problems and challenges. One such problem as Bruce Conin identified, “how to 
balance the interdependence of the states with the norms of coexistence and the standards of 
behavior accepted by the collectivity of states?”68  
 
Dealing with the vexed issue, the ICISS did a great job by changing the terminology from 
humanitarian intervention to state responsibility. The Commission, by changing the terminology, 
intelligibly moved from the obscure debate about humanitarian intervention to sovereign 
responsibility. Evans and Sahnoun observe, “Talking about the Responsibility to Protect rather 
than the right to intervene has three other big advantages; firstly, it implies evaluating the issues 
from the point of view of those needing support, rather than those who may be considering 
intervention. Secondly, this formulation implies that the primary responsibility rests with the 
state concerned. Thirdly, the Responsibility to Protect is an umbrella concept, embracing not just 
the responsibility to react but the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild as 
well.”69 The Commission in a way responded to traditional westaphalians who have consistently 
argued against humanitarian interventions as violating a state’s sovereignty and clearly stated 
that sovereignty entails responsibility and if this responsibility is not fulfilled then its shifts to 
international community. Thus, R2P reinforces the essence of sovereignty. Sovereignty 
traditionally would entail control over people while the debate steered it towards responsibility.  
 
Gareth Evans clearly articulated that sovereignty does not give a license to a state to kill its 
own people.70 Sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: internally to respect the dignity and 
                                                                                                                                                             
dilemmas.” 
67 See Arine Nadler, When is Intervention Likely? Chapter 3 in International Intervention Sovereignty vs 
Responsibility, Ed. Micheal Keren and Donald A.Sylva, 2002, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London at pg 40 
68 See Bruce Conin, Multilateral Intervention and the International Community, Chapter 9 in International 
Intervention Sovereignty vs Responsibility, Ed. Micheal Keren and Donald A.Sylva, 2002, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 
London,  at pg 148 
69 See Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, Foreign Affiars, Vol. 81, No.6 pp 
99-110 
70 See Gareth Evans, The Limits of State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect in 21st century, Eighth Neelam 
Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture, International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), Colombo, 29 July 2007 available at 
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basic rights of all people within the state and externally to the larger international community 
acting through the Security Council. In international human rights covenants, in UN practice and 
in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility and 
now it become the minimum content of good international citizenship.71 The relationship 
between sovereignty and intervention is thus increasingly viewed as complimentary rather than 
contradictory.72 Today, sovereignty is conceived as a conditional right dependent upon respect 
for a minimum standard of human rights and upon each state’s honoring its obligation to protect 
its citizens.73 Sovereignty and intervention should be seen as complementary. Appreciating the 
Commission on R2P David Chandler states, that, “Rather than delegitimizing state sovereignty 
the Commission asserts that the primary responsibility rests with the state concerned.” 74 
 
K. Humanitarian Intervention and R2P 
 
Humanitarian intervention is one of the most contested terms of this century. Since 1990’s 
the world has witnessed a proliferation in humanitarian interventions. The main debate raged 
between right to intervene and state sovereignty.75 Literal meaning of the term suggests 
intervention based on humanitarian motives.  It is defined as “coercive action by one or more 
states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and 
with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”76 Abuse of 
humanitarian intervention by the powerful has led many to fear it as a means for the powerful to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the state. Critics of R2P argue that R2P is another name for 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4967 
71 See Supra note 69, Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun,  
72 See Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, Thomas G. Weiss, The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone 
Interested in Humanitarian Intervention? Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25 No 5 (2004) pp 977-992 
73 Id. at 978 
74 See David Chandler, The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace, International Peacekeeping, 
Vol. 11, No.1, Spring 2004, pp.59-81 at 65 
75 See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone? International 
Relations, 2008 
76 See Adam Roberts, The So –Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, in Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 2000. Vol. 3 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser, 2002) cited in Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ideas in Action, Polity, Cambridge, 2007, at pg 1 
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Kofi Annan described the world’s failure to prevent or halt the Rwandan Genocide as a “sin 
of omission”.77 British Prime Minister Tony Blair promised that “If Rwanda happens again we 
would not walk away as the outside has done many time before,” and he insisted that the 
international community had a moral duty to provide military and humanitarian assistance.78 It is 
widely accepted that the Security Council has legal right to authorize humanitarian intervention 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
Throughout the 1990’s the Security Council expanded its interpretation of international peace 
and security, authorizing interventions to protect civilians. However, NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo was a turning point in this regard. The Kosovo Commission found NATO’s intervention 
to be illegal but legitimate,79 meaning that while it did not satisfy international society’s legal 
rules, it was sanctioned by its compelling moral purpose.80  David Chandler observes that, 
“Although the military intervention led by NATO lacked formal legal authority in the absence of 
a UN Security Council mandate, the advocates of intervention claimed that the intervention was 
humanitarian and thereby had a moral legitimacy and reflected the rise of new international 
norms, not accounted for in the UN Charter.”81 NATO did not have an explicit Security Council 
authorization and this by-passing of SC authority led many to question the authority of the 
Security Council, its legitimacy and credibility? Supporters of humanitarian intervention asked 
what should be done when the Security Council is in a deadlock? Do we stand by and just 
watch?  
 
It is interesting to observe that Article 4(h) of the AU’s constitutive Act, signed on July 11, 
2000, awarded the new organization “the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a 
decision by the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war, crimes, genocides and 
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crimes against humanity.”82 In 2001, Kofi Annan in his Nobel lecture argued, “Sovereignty of 
states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.”83 Nevertheless, 
the so-called right of humanitarian intervention been rejected many times by its opponents. It is 
at the heart of those who strongly support sovereignty. David Chandler states, “Opponents of 
intervention, mainly non-Western states, have been skeptical of the grounds for privileging a 
moral justification for interventionist practices and have expressed concern that this shift could 
undermine their rights of sovereignty and possibly usher in a more coercive, Western-dominated, 
international order.”84  
 
R2P, as stated earlier, seeks to preserve the sanctity of the concept sovereignty, no longer as 
a right but as a responsibility. There is a need to look at humanitarian intervention through new 
lens--the R2P lens. David Chandler argues that humanitarian intervention discourse should be 
refocused in three ways. First, that the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ should be dropped 
to appease humanitarian organizations who argue that military action is incompatible with 
humanitarian aid aimed at saving lives in the short term. Second, that rather than posing debate 
in the confrontational terms of human rights ‘trumping’ sovereignty or ‘the right of intervention’ 
undermining ‘the right of state sovereignty’, intervention should be seen as compatible with the 
concept of sovereignty. Third, he argues that intervention should not be seen as undermining the 
centrality of the UN Security Council; rather than seeking to find alternative authorization, the 
aim is to strengthen the Security Council and make it work better.85  
 
R2P makes it clear that not every situation merits intervention. It is focused on crimes related 
to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. R2P legitimizes intervention but gives it 
restricted power. R2P, adopted in the summit, further, rules out unilateral action and points at the 
Security Council as the first port of call. It must be clearly understood that no country would 
intervene if it did not have any interest in the country concerned. It is a moral duty to save and 
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help strangers from brutality in the hands of some merciless rulers. If interpreted positively, R2P 
places obligations on the international community rightly to prevent those crimes that affect our 
moral conscience only when a state is imminently failing to prevent such mass atrocities. On one 
hand, R2P reduces the likelihood of humanitarian justifications from being abused. On the other 
hand, R2P is susceptible to be interpreted the other way around resulting in limited action. The 
language of Responsibility to Protect may also be used to inhibit the emergence of consensus 
about action in genuine humanitarian emergencies.86 What is the threshold criterion to intervene 
is not clear under R2P? However, R2P is clear on one aspect that is military option should be 
used a last resort. It makes it clear that the humanitarian motives should be clear and the 
authority rests solely under the Security Council. It places the shame and blame game on the SC. 
R2P is a sensitive issue and thus, should be dealt with much care.  
 
L. R2P in the International Legal System 
 
 International law consists of rules, norms and principles that apply to nations in their 
dealings with other nations. Section 102 of the Restatement states that a rule of international law 
is one that has been accepted as such by the international community of the states in the form of 
customary law, by international agreements and by derivation of general principles common to 
the major legal systems of the world.87 At the international level we have International Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law which are applicable both at times of peace and 
war. As Manfred Nowak observes, International Human Rights law is a set of rules well 
established by conventions or customs and codified in international treaties.88 These have 
consistently addressed the position of the individual and the responsibility of the state with 
respect to individuals. Today, the treatment by a state of its own individuals has now become a 
matter of international concern. International human rights law is the vehicle for expression of 
that concern.89  
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 The UN Charter as well as the Universal declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has 
served as a point of departure for further elaboration of the international human rights system. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRD), 
the convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, all form together a basis 
for a strong international human rights law. Today, a number of norms mentioned in the UDHR 
have attained the status of customary international law. In addition to the prohibition of torture, 
they include they include the prohibition against arbitrary detention, summary execution or 
murder, causing disappearances of individuals, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
genocide.90 Thus, the states are seen to possess more responsibility. As Dorota Gierycz observes, 
“the human rights system has been based on the responsibility of states as actors in the 
international arena and bearers of human rights obligations under international law.”91  
 
 As Steiner, Alston and Goodman write, “Customary law refers to conduct or the 
conscious abstention from certain conduct of states that becomes in some measure a part of 
international legal order.”92 They write that, customary international law results from a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of obligation.93 The consistent 
practice has evolved after the Nazi atrocities. States through their practice have observed 
genocide as a peremptory norm of international law and as a universal crime. The jus cogens or 
peremptory norms are said to be so fundamental that they bind all states, and no nation may 
derogate from or agree to contravene them. Jus cogens have been defined under Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the treaties. 94 The prohibition of genocide, slavery and torture 
have been said to be a part of jus cogens95 and hence, no derogation is possible.  
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 International Law is well established in this regard and R2P enforces the responsibilities 
and obligation cast on the national and international community. Dorota Giercyz rightly observes 
that, “the obligations reflected in the clause stem from well established rules and principles of 
customary and treaty international human rights law and international humanitarian law and 
these are universally biding.”96 R2P prescribes protection from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. Deeply rooted in the existing international legal systems 
R2P recognizes the failure of the international community to fulfill their obligations and gives 
them one more opportunity to effectively protect human rights. It casts a more important 
responsibility on the sovereign himself and thus evades with the concept of sovereignty as 
authority. R2P thus reminds us and cautions us of our strong beliefs and faith in international 
legal system for a more perfect world.  
 
M. R2P as an Emerging Norm 
 
The High level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change endorsed R2P as an emerging 
norm. Kofi Annan in his report, In Larger Freedom, embraced this norm. However, scholars 
lately have questioned if R2P is an emerging norm at all instead of soft law or a political 
principle. Even considering that R2P may gradually replace our notions on sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention in this century, it still needs to gain support and confidence. Some 
consider R2P a ‘Political catchword’.97 Suggestions such as further tuning and commitment by 
all states have been suggested in order for R2P to develop into an organizing principle.98 Some 
argue that many of the elements of R2P are not novel, but rooted in a broader ideological or legal 
tradition. They further advance the argument that state responsibility may be used to constrain, 
rather than enable Council involvement.99 
  
Indeed, R2P is based on existing international legal system. However, it does include novel 
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concepts. By rewriting the very definition of sovereignty as responsibility, it has cautioned states 
that sovereignty does not give them a ticket to do whatever they want to. It presses upon the 
states to responsibly respect the rights and dignity of their citizens. It stresses that if a state fails 
to fulfill this responsibility then it shifts this responsibility to greater international community. 
Thus, R2P cautions states to respect and abide by the international norms that they signed up for 
and the need for good international citizenship. Thus it is not the responsibility of the states 
alone, but also of the international community to protect people when a state is imminently 
failing to do so. R2P for the first time in the history of international law used the word ‘caution’, 
which is not done even in the UN Charter.   
 
The idea of intervention might have well existed in the international system, but this system 
never laid down any ground rules. UN Charter provides for a UN SC action for the use of 
military force. However, the rules of use of force have been violated either by unilateral action or 
through a multilateral organization resulting in heavy consequences. R2P curtails such unilateral 
actions and puts Security Council as first port of call and as the final authority. R2P seeks for a 
better and uniform world with a protectionist attitude. It lays down prevention, protection and 
rebuilding as the main themes.    
 
R2P calls for action. It is a call for prevention, intervention and post conflict 
reconstruction.100 Developing countries should realize that R2P offers better protection through 
agreed and negotiated rules and roadmaps for when outside intervention is justified and how it 
may be done under the UN authority rather than unilaterally.101 Recent developments show that 
R2P is being widely accepted and is seen to provide impetus to the Security Council to act. Thus, 
it restores confidence in the legitimacy and credibility of the SC. However, the acts in Georgia 
and the continuing failure to act in Darfur demonstrate the difficulty to realize R2P in operational 
terms. Understanding R2P could rightly help in operationalizing it.  As Andy Knight states, R2P  
is currently in an evolving from, a norm that initially clashed with the state sovereignty/non-
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intervention norm to one that essentially fits into normative developments that have occurred in 
the international system and global community over the past 58 years or so.102 
 
N. Conclusion 
 
In traditional international relations and international law, the term humanitarian intervention 
had simply referred to military interventions. As Micheal Newman observes, “R2P therefore 
constituted a real conceptual change both because it incorporated peaceful as well as coercive 
actions by international forces and accepted that there was a relationship between wider 
development and human security issues and the kinds of crisis that could conceivably precipitate 
military intervention as a last resort.”103  R2P therefore, is an emerging norm, prescribed in our 
existing international legal system; it reinforces sovereignty with responsibility and places 
humanitarian intervention in its rightful place. R2P should serve to strengthen efforts to protect 
women, children, minorities, internally displaced persons and refugees. As suggested by Edward 
C. Luck, the international community should co-operate to bring the breach of peremptory norms 
of international law to an end by using lawful means.104 The main challenges that lie in front of 
R2P alongwith with conceptual challenges are building capacities to strengthen the Security 
Council in its actions.  
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THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
Security Council is the most powerful and, yet the most, complicated body in the whole 
United Nations system created under the United Nations Charter in 1945. The Council is 
composed of the five most powerful permanent members; USA, UK, France, USSR and China, 
who are endowed with the power to veto105 any issue. In addition, there are ten other non 
permanent members elected by the General Assembly who serve for a two years term.106 The 
Security Council is mainly entrusted with the primary responsibility to maintain international 
peace and security and the members agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility 
the Security Council acts on their behalf.107 Pursuant to its duties, the Council dispatches military 
operations, imposes sanctions, mandates arms inspections, deploys election monitors108 and 
performs broad police like functions.109 The Council has been largely inactive during the Cold 
War period, but since 1990 and the thawing of the global political climate, it has been very 
active.110 Much of the recent literature has focused on the role of the Security Council, its powers 
and functions and its successes and failures.  
 
With the passage of time the SC has become more involved with human rights protection 
and more recently protection of the rights of women and children. Events such as genocides, 
crimes against humanity, terrorism have taken the debate to a new level, challenging the 
legitimacy and credibility of the UNSC. The debates mainly involved the failure of the SC to 
respond in a timely manner to meets its core obligations/responsibilities, threat to its legitimacy 
when its authority is by-passed by some countries and regional organizations. Furthermore, the 
Security Council has been charged to be undemocratic, and ineffective.111 Misuse of the veto 
power to further self interests of the P5 has furthered the concerns of many. These discussions 
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have high-lightened the inherent tensions in the global power systems.  
 
Edward C. Luck observes that, “Debates over the composition of the Council, as well as 
over the veto power of the permanent five, reflect the inherent tension between the founding goal 
of assuring the leadership and collaboration of the nations most capable of enforcing Council’s 
will and the norms of universality and representatives espoused by a growing and increasingly 
diverse membership.”112 Along with these tensions, the Council is devoid of unity among its 
members over many issues. Deliberations about a possible Security Council reform and 
expansion have also taken place among scholars, NGO’s, think tanks and some even at UN level. 
Kofi Annan said, “Unless the Security Council can unite around the aim of confronting massive 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity…then we will betray the very ideals that 
inspired the founding of the United Nations.”113  
 
History shows that the SC has failed to keep its promise. Ingvar Carlsson’s report found 
that the UN ignored evidence that genocide was planned and had refused to act once it began. 
The report is critical about the SC’s April 21, 1994 decision to reduce the strength of the United 
Nations Mission for Rwanda.114 Similarly, the SC failed to act in Kosovo. However, an action 
without a proper SC authorization threatens the international security system. The Council 
remained standstill when burning issues were lying on its table. Blame not only the Council, but 
also the geo-politics. The world summit clearly laid out that the SC should be the first port of call 
whenever it comes to intervention.  
 
The need of the hour is not to drag the discussion about SC’s failures to act but to find 
ways that will enable the decision making process at the UNSC. Building institutional capacity is 
one of the keys for successful implementation of R2P. The institutions should be developed for 
all three core goals: responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild.115 UN has got the necessary 
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institutional capacities. We need a framework built upon these institutions that will help the SC 
to act promptly and swiftly. 
 
O. Duties and Powers of the Security Council: 
 
The UN Charter imposes general duties upon both the Security Council and UN Member 
states. Under Article 24 (1) of the Charter, “Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the SC acts on their behalf.116 In carrying out these powers 
the SC shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the UN. Under Article 25, 
members in turn “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC.”117  The broad powers of 
the Security Council are provided in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. The powers 
could be divided in different parts namely; powers for pacific settlement of disputes, powers to 
determine the existence of threat to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression, and  powers 
to decide what measures to be taken to restore international peace and security. 
 
i. Powers for Pacific Settlement of Disputes 
 
Article 33 of the Charter provides that: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, 
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”118 
Clause 2 of Article 33 provides, “The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon 
the parties to settle their dispute by such means.”119 Article 34 provides that, “The Security 
Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction 
or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation 
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is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”120 The Charter thus, 
clearly lays emphasis on peaceful resolution of threats against international peace and security as 
the primary means.  
 
ii. Powers to Determine Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the peace and Acts of Aggression 
   
It is only within the powers of the SC to determine if a situation is a threat to peace and 
security. The SC has complete discretion in this regard. When peaceful means are not sufficient 
the Charter entrusts the SC to use forceful means against the violating states. These powers are 
enumerated under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Chapter affords extensive powers to the 
Council in carrying out its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Article 39 
of the Charter provides: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”121  
 
Article 41 provides that, “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means 
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”122 Article 42 provides that, 
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.”123  
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In addition, Article 51 lays down the inherent right of individual or collective self defense 
if an armed attack occurs against a UN member state, but only until the SC has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. It further provides, such self defense 
measures shall be immediately reported to the SC and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the SC under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary.124 Article 53 further states no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by the regional agencies without the prior authorization of the SC.125  
 
Thus, the Charter provided the Council with broad powers. The Charter makes it very 
clear that the Security Council could legitimately use force to restore international peace and 
security but, only after exhaustion of the non military measures.  Furthermore, the above 
mentioned rules clearly demonstrate that the founding fathers of the UN have reserved a pivotal 
role for the SC in the UN system for the maintenance of international peace and security.126 
Furthermore, the Charter also vests the Council with the powers to authorize regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.127 
 
P. Limitations on the Powers of the Security Council 
 
David Schweigman observes that, “once a Chapter VII situation arises, the SC is of the 
opinion that it can take any and all of the measures that it considers useful and suitable for 
dealing with the situation or any of its consequences, whether those actions are of a military, 
administrative, regulatory or even primarily judicial nature.”128 These set of options to the SC 
has opened a debate on the limits of its power. The limitations can briefly be summed up as 1) as 
the Security Council derives its powers from the Charter, it must abide by it.  The Appeals 
chamber of the ICTY said, “Neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the 
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Security Council as legibus solutes (unbound by law)129, 2) it must act in accordance with the 
object and purpose of the UN,130 3) it should give respect to sovereign equality131 and may not 
violate a state’s political independence and territorial integrity, 4) it must evaluate the impact of 
its decisions on the human rights of the people affected by those decisions,132 5) it shall not take 
any enforcement action under Chapter VII without making a prior determination, 6) the 
determination shall be made by the Security Council only in the light and scope of the purposes, 
principles and object under the UN and, 7) finally, the Council is obligated to act in good faith.  
 
Q. Security Council and Human Rights: An Era of Resolutions 
 
Over the years, the Security Council has not exercised its power against states that have 
engaged in gross and persistent violations of human rights of their own citizens. For the first 
time, the Council invoked Article 39 against South Rhodesia holding that a state’s violations of 
human rights constitute a threat to the peace and adopted mandatory economic sanctions in 1966 
against South Rhodesia.133 Sydney Bailey identified two phases in the Council’s treatment for 
human rights: the first from 1946 to 1989 and the second from 1989 to 1994. In the first phase 
Bailey found the Council acted in a cautious, empirical and haphazard way while in the second 
period, he said, the Council began to venture forth in the area of human rights.134 Cold War 
mainly precluded the Council from acting. Brian Urquhart says, “The unanticipated Cold War 
and the forty year standoff between the Soviet Union and the West was the first obstacle to the 
realization of the UN Charter’s dream of a collective security system run by the UN Security 
Council and based in the military strength of its five permanent members.”135   
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However, it is not only the Cold War, as Niels Blokker observes, the UNSC lacked teeth 
as it did not have a standing UN force at its disposal.136 The power to veto further excluded the 
Council from playing the crucial role even though time and place demanded. Veto has become a 
vexed issue. Recently, there have been debates on veto reform, restricting the use of veto or 
completely dropping the power to veto or expanding the SC and giving the new members a right 
to veto.  Furthermore, the end of cold war did not end conflicts in the world rather increased the 
complexity of wars. The nature of wars changed from wars between two states to wars within the 
states.137 Nevertheless, the end of cold war brought much activity in the Council. Since the 1990 
the UNSC has adopted many resolutions and has frequently resorted to Chapter VII. The recent 
developments could be summarized as Niels Blokker states, “A widening interpretation of the 
notion threat to the peace has evolved; the second and even third generation of UN peacekeeping 
has been established; discussions concerning the creation of a UN standing force have taken 
place and so on.”138 
 
The first active resolution was taken when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Resolution 660 
condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and determined that there exists a threat to 
international peace and security. The resolution demanded the immediate unconditional 
withdrawal of the Iraqi forces.139 Resolution 678 reaffirmed Resolution 660 which determined 
that Iraq had committed a breach of the peace and authorized member states “to use all necessary 
means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area.140 The resolution expressed concern that Iraq’s 
actions had led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to 
cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region.141 
Resolution 660, Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe observed that, “The Security Council 
for the first time in its history stated a clear and explicit linkage between human rights violations 
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materially within a state (although there were indeed international repercussions) and a threat to 
international security.”142 They argued that, “since 1945 the UN Security Council apparently has 
had the authority to authorize the use of force to correct human rights violations, as well as 
authorize non-forcible measures.”143  
 
 Thus, began an era of SC resolutions i.e. SC activism for the protection of human rights. 
The Security Council through its Resolution 794 of December 3 1992, authorized the use of 
force to restore peace, stability and law and order in Somalia. In its resolution it determined that, 
“the magnitude of the human rights tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further 
exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, 
constituted a threat to international peace and security.”144  The Security widened its 
interpretation of what constitutes threat to international peace and security by considering human 
rights violations in Somalia. The international community, as observed by Richard Lillich, “is 
taking an important step in developing a strategy for dealing with the potential disorder and 
conflicts of the post cold war world.”145 Through its various resolutions the SC is of the opinion 
that the internal situation in and of itself warrants action. 
 
In 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 940, which arguably, is considered the 
purest UN humanitarian intervention to date.146 Through the resolution the Security Council 
expressed its grave concern caused by the “significant further deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of 
systematic violations of civil liberties,”147 and determined that “the situation in Haiti continues to 
constitute a threat to peace and security in the region.”148 The Council authorized the formation 
of a multinational force under unified command and control to restore the legitimately elected 
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President and authorities of the Government of Haiti and extension of the mandate of the UN 
Mission in Haiti.149 The Security Council through its resolution 1031 of 1995 on the 
implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina determined that the situation 
in the region constitutes threat to peace and security.150 Resolution 1244 of 1999 expressed its 
concern on humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and determined that the situation in the region 
constituted a threat to peace and security.151 
 
Resolution 748 adopted with respect to Libya the Security Council stated that, 
“suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which states are directly or 
indirectly involved, is essential to maintain international peace and security.152 Under Resolution 
1373 the Security Council reaffirmed that, “such acts, like any act of international terrorism,” 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.”153 It called for states to work together 
urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full 
implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism.154  
 
Under Resolution 1540 the Security Council,  “Affirmed  its resolve to take appropriate 
and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in 
conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter.”155 
The resolution was not directed at a particular terrorist act but to all future terrorist acts and in 
this regard the Council is seen as a global law maker.156 On October 31 2000, Security Council 
adopted a landmark Resolution 1325 specifically addressing the impact of war on women, and 
women’s contribution to conflict resolution and sustainable peace.157 UNSC Resolution 1820 
adopted in 2008, states unequivocally, that “rape and other forms of sexual violence can 
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constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” 
and noted that, “the states and the parties to the conflict bear the primary responsibility to ensure 
the protection of affected civilians.”158  
 
Thus, as B.G. Ramacharan states, “the practice of the Security Council suggests that it 
could become more actively engaged in human rights situations such as following: those which 
entail threats to, or breaches of, international peace and security; those which involve a 
breakdown of governmental authority in the country concerned, those which entail a flouting of 
the authority of the United Nations, those which involve a high magnitude of human suffering or 
crimes against humanity, where the government requests so, where the conscience of the 
international community is shocked.”159 Nevertheless, the SC did not act in all situations alike. 
There has been no consistency in the Council’s actions. It decides and acts however it likes. This 
shows the reality that SC acts only when the situation affects anyone of the permanent members.  
 
R. The Dilemnas:  
 
i. Political 
 
The Council’s activism generated ample controversies. It was perceived by many in the 
south that the Council is being used as a means by the super five to fulfill their own self interests. 
UN was the only place where the countries from the south could put forward their concerns and 
countries doubted when they saw inconsistency in the SC’s actions. Richard B. Lillich reminds 
us that embracing the doctrine of UN sanctioned humanitarian intervention, it should not be 
overlooked that the Council, as the key player in this area, does not necessarily reflect the views 
of many UN members.160 For example, The Zimbabwe minister pointed out that, “great care has 
to be taken to see that these domestic conflicts are not used as a pretext for the intervention of 
big powers in the legitimate domestic affairs of small states, or that human rights issues are not 
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used for totally different purposes of destabilizing other governments.”161 He suggested for a, 
“need to strike a delicate balance between the rights of the States, as enshrined in the Charter, 
and the right of individuals, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”162  
 
SC authorizations have become a major practice, asking countries concerned to take all 
measures necessary including the use of force against the offending country. Concerns grew 
more after the SC Resolution 678 on Iraq. Columbia expressed its concern saying that, “the SC is 
delegating authority without specifying to whom. Nor do we know where that authority is to be 
exercised or who receives it. Indeed, whoever does receive it is not accountable to anyone.”163 
Yemen referred to, SC resolution 678, as a classic example of authority without 
accountability.164  Malaysia noted that when UNSC provides the authorization for countries to 
use force, these countries are fully accountable for actions to the Council through a clear system 
of reporting and accountability, which is not adequately covered in Res 678.165 
 
Such authorizations have enabled scholars to ask questions such as what is the role of the 
Security Council? Are there any Charter conditions which these resolutions must satisfy or is the 
Council free to give the member states in question carte blanche? Are there any conditions 
outside the UN Charter? 
 
ii. Legal Dilemnas 
 
Dilemmas always remained to questions such as; who would have a say when the 
Security Council acts ultra vires? If judicial review of it’s resolution is possible? If it is within 
the authority of the Security Council to establish tribunals such as; ICTY and ICTR? Thomas 
Franck precisely puts the questions and states, “Is there any conceivable point beyond which a 
legal issue may properly arise as to the competence of the SC to produce such overriding results? 
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If there are any limits, what are those limits and what body, if other than the SC, is competent to 
say what those limits are?”166 Such questions came in front when Libya challenged the SC 
resolutions in a case before the International Court of Justice as ultra vires.  
 
S. SC and ICJ 
 
In 1992, before the ICJ, Libya challenged SC resolution 748, based upon the threat to the 
peace rationale, ordering it to surrender two of its nationals accused of bombing Pan Am flight 
103 as Ultra Vires.167 In Libya v U.S. Judge Weeramantry succinctly put forward the question: 
“does…the SC discharge its variegated functions free of all limitations, or is there a 
circumscribing boundary of norms or principles within which the responsibilities are to be 
discharged?”168 The brief majority opinion appears to find that both Libya and the US, as 
members of the UN, are obliged to accept and carry out decisions of the SC in accordance with 
article 25 of the Charter, including the obligations imposed by SC res 748.169 The majority 
further concluded that the obligations of the parties in that respect prevail over their obligations 
under any other international agreement, including the Montreal Convention. This conclusion the 
majority reaches by an interpretation of the effect of Charter Article 103.170  
 
However, several judges in this case opined, that, under certain circumstances, a decision 
by the SC might be viewed as invalid. It is seemingly difficult to locate substantive limitations 
on the Council’s actions taken under Chap VII as the Charter provides wide discretion to the 
Council.171 Nevertheless, the Council is an organ of the UN and it’s acts should be in accordance 
to the Charter. As Thomas Franck observes, “The legality of actions by any UN organ must be 
judged by reference to the Charter as a “constitution” of delegated powers. In extreme cases, the 
court may have to be the last-resort defender of the system’s legitimacy if the UN is to continue 
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to enjoy the adherence of its members.”172  
 
There were also questions raised as to whether the SC had the powers to authorize 
resolutions. Resolutions are the means through which the SC acts and authorizes. Without such 
powers to authorize the Council will be left impotent if it is necessary to take military 
enforcement measures. The SC has both explicit and implicit power to take military enforcement 
actions to perform its functions. Without UN forces, and without coalitions of the able and 
willing authorized by the SC, no other instrument is available to the UN. The whole UN system 
would be rendered ineffective. The Council is indispensable. As Niels Blokker observes, if the 
Council were not entitled to use authorization instrument, the UN could not have acted in most 
or all of the cases in which it has now played role.173 
 
T. Credibility of the SC 
 
As it has been observed the Security Council invited much controversy after the use of 
force against Iraq. The debate over the Council’s credibility shifted from the question of 
democratic representation within the Security Council to whether the unsurpassable U.S power 
be constrained. As Thomas Weiss observes, “The obstacle to the Security Council credibility go 
beyond issues of process – exclusive permanent membership and the right to veto- to include 
unparalleled US military might.”174 Many perceive that somehow America’s military, economic 
and political often reflects the American attitude that it is the sole superpower in the world and 
that it can do whatever it wants. The US National Security Strategy Document of September 
2002- stated that the US will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self 
defense by acting pre-emptively.175 This clearly puts the American position that it can act alone.  
  
Thus, as Mats Berdal observes, “The only option that the Security Council seems to have is 
to endorse US action otherwise it would only complicate and fetter its leadership in the 
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international system.”176 In September 2002, President Bush warned that he would act alone if 
the UN failed to cooperate. It was with the rise in American unipolarity – not Iraqi crisis – that, 
along with cultural clashes and different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the 
Council’s credibility.177 Doctrine of preemption directly contradicts the basic percepts of the UN 
Charter. American policy bases itself on the premise that Americans cannot let our enemies 
strike first.178 Therefore if necessary, act preemptively.  
 
 Furthermore, along with these controversies surrounding the might of US, there is 
another steep problem in the UN that reflects an ideological difference between countries from 
north and south. UN is divided on the very question- when an armed intervention is appropriate? 
The rules on the use of force has almost debacled the UN system. This is further evidence by the 
power struggle in our international relations. There is major power struggle in the UN and 
especially within the Security Council. Micheal J. Glennon observes that, “The old power 
structure gave the Soviet Union an incentive to deadlock the Council; the current power structure 
encourages the US to bypass it.”179 He further states, “approve an American attack, and it would 
have seemed to rubber stamp what it could not stop. Express disapproval of a war, and the US 
would have vetoed the attempt. Disagreement over Iraq did not doom the Council; geopolitical 
reality did.”180 The UN’s members have an obligation under the Charter to comply with SC’s 
decisions. They therefore have a right to expect the Council to render its decisions clearly. 
  
It would however be wrong to negate the Security Council’s or for the matter UN’s 
functioning even though they prove to fail often at times of great stress. The Security Council 
itself hobbled along during the Cold War, underwent a brief resurgence in the 1990’s, and then 
flamed out with Kosovo and Iraq.181 Nevertheless, the SC will still prove to be useful at times for 
it is the only authority that has the power and resources to act when it is most needed. 
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The Iraqi crisis thus raised questions regarding the Council’s authorizations. It questioned 
1) Whether SC has authorized the use of force 2) What are the determinants of such 
authorization and 3) Whether the authorization has terminated.182 The UN is underpinned by two 
fundamental rules, namely, use of peaceful means to resolve the disputes and the Security 
Council as the sole authority to use force to maintain peace and security. As Jules and Ratner 
argue, ‘To ensure that UN authorized uses of force comport with those two intertwined values, 
three rules can be derived from Article 2(4) of the Charter: 1. Explicit and not implicit SC 
authorization is necessary before a nation may use force that does not derive from the right to 
self defense under Article 51 2. Authorizations should clearly articulate and limit the objectives 
for which force may be employed and ambiguous authorizations should be narrowly construed 
and 3. The authorization to use force should cease with the establishment of a permanent 
ceasefire unless explicitly extended by the SC.”183 
 
U. SC, Darfur and R2P 
 
Darfur, cannot be left in any discussion on humanitarian crisis and on national and 
international responsibility. It is described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.184  The 
United Kingdom International Development Committee Report (2005) on Darfur estimated that, 
“ 2.4 million people are directly affected by the crisis and are in need of humanitarian assistance. 
Of these, 1.84 million people have been driven out of their homes but remain in Darfur. Another 
200,000 people have fled across the border to Chad.”185 The Committee said, in its view the 
crimes committed are no less serious and heinous than genocide.186 It also said that, “The 
government of the Sudan bears the primary responsibility for the suffering of the people of 
Darfur. But when a government commits atrocities against its own citizens, then the international 
community has a responsibility to protect those people.”187 
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The current conflict in Darfur began in 2003, when black African rebel groups rose up 
against Sudan’s Arab-dominated central government, demanding an end to the social, economic 
and political marginalization of their region.188 Struggle for resources has historically, been the 
major source of conflict within Darfur ever since it got independence in 1956. Darfur has been 
subjected to extreme social, political and economical exploitation by the colonial powers and 
later by the central government after Sudan’s independence in 1956.189 The Sudanese 
government and its proxy militia, known as the janjaweed, were responsible for a large-scale 
campaign of death and destruction in western Sudan.190  
 
The UN Security Council, the European Union and a variety of NGOs all acknowledged 
that the government of Sudan was complicit in large scale crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing in Darfur. The government of Sudan has denied all accusations.191 NGOs, such as 
physicians for human rights192 and Justice Africa,193 went further, calling the crisis a genocide. 
Speaking at the United Nations Human Rights Commission on the tenth anniversary of the 
Rwandan genocide, Kofi Annan said that events in Darfur left him with a deep sense of 
foreboding.194 On 9 September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in the US Congress, 
announced to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, “We concluded- I concluded- 
genocide had been committed in Darfur.”195 However, even after such labeling there has been a 
very low response. As Williams and Bellamy observe, “Alongside the usual array of NGO 
activities, international society’s responses to Darfur’s crisis have come primarily in the form of 
humanitarian assistance through the UN and its specialized programmes and agencies, the USA 
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and the EU. In political terms the responses have been slow, tepid and divided.”196  
 
The first SC resolution mentioning Darfur was Resolution 1547 on 11 June 2004. The 
Resolution welcomed the signature of the Declaration on 5 June 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya, in 
which the parties confirmed their agreement to the six protocols signed between the Government 
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and reconfirmed their 
commitment to completing the remaining stages of negotiations.197 On 30 July, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council authorized Resolution 1556, which determined that 
the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat of international peace and security and imposed an 
arms embargo on the region, supported the deployment of the African Union (AU) protection 
force and demanded the Sudanese government to disarm the janjaweed or face sanctions.198 
Through the SC Resolution 1574 the Council declared its strong support for the efforts of the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army to reach a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.199 Irrespective of such resolutions and peace agreement the 
government is complicit in many crimes. Recently the UN Security Council through it’s 
Resolution 1769 authorized the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a 
peacekeeping mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.200  
 
The crisis is Darfur is political and truly is a test case as well. For some the sanctions went 
too far: China and Pakistan explained their abstentions in the SC vote by rejecting the need for 
mandatory measures against Sudan.201 Russia’s opposition to intervention is arguably connected 
to concerns about Chechnya, but it also has substantial commercial interests in the region, 
especially since it has sold around 150 Million USD worth of military equipment to Sudan, and 
in 2002, signed a $200 million oil deal with the Sudanese government.202 It is obvious that 
Russia might fear that Sudan might default its payments. The Sudanese government is failing to 
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meet its responsibility and geopolitics let the international community fail in its obligations. In 
this sense, what does R2P mean to Darfur? Khartoum does whatever it pleases and claims its 
sovereign right. The government has launched numerous major offensives against civilians after 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006, and has repeatedly detailed plans 
for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. It expelled the special representative of the Secy. Gen. 
Jan Pronk from Sudan in October 2006.203 As some scholar has observed, “The international 
community’s failure to solve the Darfur crisis is rooted in the age old dilemma that plagues 
international law and, by consequence, the R2P doctrine: How do you ensure that renegade states 
follow the rules?”204 
 
In this regard regional organizations are better placed to play an active role. African 
Union has a major role to play. AU has been commended for facilitating the N’djamena 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed on 8 April 2004. AU has been playing an active 
interventionist role, which is a fundamental shift from its policy of non interference in the 
internal affairs of the member states. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive act clearly stipulates 
“the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”205 
 
Former UN Secy. Gen Kofi Annan stressed time and again that the principle of state 
sovereignty cannot be used as a shield for human rights abuses. With respect to the dilemma of 
R2P application to the Darfur case one anonymous writer said, “As legally correct and morally 
compelling as humanitarian intervention is under the R2P doctrine, the ongoing crisis in Darfur 
demonstrates that state sovereignty can still trump human rights.”206 The same scholar further 
said, “A test of R2P reveals that the responsibility to protect remain an embryonic doctrine that is 
by no means self executing and, at present, lacks the dexterity to overcome real world 
politics.”207 Looking at the time line from 2003-2010, the world community should be ashamed 
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of its failure to constructively act in Darfur. Strategic interests should be kept aside and help 
should reach out to those in need. As Micheal Glennon writes, “If judged by the suffering of non 
combatants, the use of force can often be more humane than economic sanctions, which starve 
more children than soldiers.”208   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
V. Establishing a Security Council Sub-Committee on R2P 
 
The ICISS in its report stated, “if international consensus is ever to be reached about when, 
where, how and by whom military intervention should happen, it is very clear that the central 
role of the Security Council will have to be at the heart of that consensus. The task is not to find 
alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council 
work better than it has.”209 At the apex of the world’s collective security machinery, the Security 
Council is, in theory, equipped to captain collective responses to mass atrocities.210 The Council 
has discharged its functions in numerous ways through various resolutions. These resolutions 
bind every nation in the world. In order to efficiently discharge its responsibilities the Council 
has established various subsidiary bodies. For example in order to bring the persons responsible 
for war crimes and Genocide the Council has established the ICTY and ICTR. It has working 
group on children and armed conflict, a working group on documentation, a UN compensation 
Commission, 1540 committee, counter-terrorism committee, sanctions committee and a peace-
building Commission.211 These subsidiary bodies function according to their mandates as 
outlined in the respective SC Resolution.  
 
One body that seems to be very much in close with the ideals of the R2P is the Peace 
Building Commission. In 2005 the General Assembly through its Resolution A/60/180 and the 
Security Council Resolution 1645 established the UN Peace Building Commission (PBC).212 The 
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mandate of the Commission include: marshalling resources and to advice on and propose 
integrated strategies for post-conflict peace building and recovery.213 The PBC focuses attention 
on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from 
conflicts. It is specifically mandated to:214  
· Propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; 
· Help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial 
investment over the medium- to longer-term; 
· Extend the period of attention the international community gives to post-conflict 
recovery;  
· Develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, 
security, humanitarian and development actors. 
However, the Commission focuses specifically on post conflict rebuilding. There is a need 
for a more effective body that could work together with the other UN mechanisms and bring in 
more information to the SC in order to help it arrive to a decision as to whether a situation merits 
to invoke the R2P principle. That body should be able to connect the bridges in the flow of 
information within the UN bodies and help in analyzing preventive strategies.  
R2P’s main focus is to develop preventive measures. One good solution could be – creating a 
Security Council Sub-Committee on R2P, suggests Dastoor.215 The sub-committee would be 
tasked with monitoring and analyzing situations worldwide where the application of R2P might 
be appropriate.216 This hypothetical sub-committee could help bridge all the institutional 
mechanisms in the UN to the Security Council. The committee would consist of experts in the 
field who would work in collaboration of the Secy. Gen., the office of the special adviser on the 
prevention of genocide, and mass atrocities, the special adviser to Secy. Gen. on Responsibility 
to protect and the UN Peace Building Commission. The sub-committee would help in building a 
framework for prevention, for reaction including using of force and rebuilding. The Security 
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Council should accept the findings of the committee and should not use veto power otherwise, it 
would undermine the whole UN system. Such a committee would also avoid the risk of unilateral 
intervention and ensure a consistent application of R2P.  
W. Refraining from the threat and use of Veto 
 
Interestingly the Security Council has become increasingly interested in human rights since 
1990. It has declared that human rights violations are a threat to international peace and security. 
The UN resolution on R2P provided that the Security Council should be the first port of call. 
However, Security Council is sometimes not in a position to act or is deadlocked. This happens 
because of the use of the veto by any one of the permanent five members. UN reform has been in 
debates for a while now. One of the many reforms proposed is the reform of the Security 
Council. Developing countries have demanded for an expansion of the permanent members 
which represents the world’s most powerful five. They say that the composition of the Security 
Council is undemocratic and underrepresented.217 The veto power of the P5 has been described 
as the “bane” of the Security Council and a tool of inaction that limits its effectiveness and 
causes dysfunction.218 On the other hand, some P5 members believe that the veto represents the 
sustaining force of the system of collective security.219 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has called for the 
permanent five to refrain from the use of veto when situations such as mass atrocities are on the 
floor. This power of veto was given to the powerful five in 1945 by the members of the United 
Nations.220 The permanent members will never agree to any proposition that will deprive them of 
this privilege. Scholars such as Thomas G. Weiss suggest us not to waste our energies in 
mindless call for equity and eliminating veto, and say that there exists no consensus about the 
exact shape of the SC or the elimination of veto.221 He says a Security Council of 21 or 25 would 
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hardly improve effectiveness.222 Even though there is no clear understanding about reform, the 
Security Council when it comes to matters related to mass atrocities, or human rights violations 
must refrain itself from using veto. Creating a Sub- Committee for the SC on R2P could to a 
large extent ease veto problem. It would assist the SC in coming to a decision based on its 
independent and fair evaluation and assessment arrived after analyzing the information available 
from other UN bodies.  
X. Strengthening UN Early warning and Preventive Diplomacy mechanisms 
 
Early warning mechanism essentially involves collecting information, making risk 
assessment, detailed monitoring and analysis of selected situations of concern and then 
dissemination of information to those who could take preventive steps.223 The early warning 
function could be defined as the collection, analysis and communication of information about 
escalatory developments in situations that could potentially lead to genocide, crimes against 
humanity or massive and serious war crimes far enough in advance for relevant UN organs to 
take timely and effective preventive measures.224  Former Secy. Gen Kofi Annan made early 
warning a major part of his proposals and initiatives regarding the prevention of genocide and 
made early warning as a central part of the mandate of the Special Adviser on the prevention of 
genocide.225 The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict said, “Early warning and 
early response is one of the measures to avoid imminent violence.”226 It said, “The capacity to 
anticipate and analyze possible conflicts is a pre requisite for prudent decision making and 
effective action and should be constantly updated contingency plans for preventive action.”227 
The early warning mechanism is based on the study and analysis of the relevant information in a 
conflict zone. It helps us understand the conflict, the degree of its intensity; the stake holders 
involved and direct us to take prudent decision. Collection and dissemination of information is 
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vital to build an effective early warning mechanism. Information should be collected on every 
element of the crime of genocide such as; intent, hate speech, intent to exterminate one entire 
group. Early warning is included in the mandate of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide and Mass Atrocities; it should rather have been kept outside his mandate. May be the 
office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights should create a body to collect information. 
The special adviser should be the focal point.  
UN has great sources from which it could receive valuable information. NGO, 
intergovernmental agencies and various UN bodies play vital role and have information that 
could be used to make an early assessment of a conflict situation and chalk out a plan for early 
action. The need is to filtering and interpreting the information.228 It becomes problematic when 
the information received is not reliable or when there is a lack of political will to act.  
Nevertheless, the politics and bureaucracy within UN could grossly affect the early warning 
mechanism. One of the major problems of early warning is, “not a lack of warning but the fact 
that governments often ignore an incipient crisis or take a passive attitude towards it until it 
escalates into a deadly struggle or a major catastrophe.”229 Governments should assist in the flow 
of information to the Special Adviser as he is the focal point.  
Early warning mechanisms should help us in early recognition of a conflict and take early 
action. The motive behind is prevention is better than cure. Early warning capacities will 
enhance the chances of better implementation of R2P.230 The world summit also provides that 
the member countries should help in building early warning mechanisms.  
Y. Establishing UN Military 
  
 UN is dependent on its member countries for military personnel. Every time the Security 
Council votes to deploy peacekeepers the UN has to appeal for troops and equipments from 
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scratch.231 As Rachman observes, “Creating a permanent UN capability would mean that the UN 
could intervene much more quickly. It would also make it more likely that forces assigned to the 
UN follow the same military doctrines. It would also help address chronic shortages of 
equipment.”232 Brian Urquhart proposed for an UN volunteer military force. He said "a timely 
intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force, willing and authorized to take combat 
risks and representing the will of the international community, could make a decisive difference 
in the early stages of the crisis."233 He further said, “such an international force would be under 
the exclusive authority of the Security Council and under the day-to-day direction of the 
secretary-general."234 However, establishing the military force could be a difficult task. It could 
meet operational difficulties such as financial constraints. The question also arises as to what 
kind of situations merit deployment of UN force. Every country would not accept every situation 
to justify UN intervention and furthermore the vexing issue of strengthening the credibility of the 
Security Council needs to be addressed. Nevertheless, one major advantage of having a standing 
UN military force is that the UN can immediately deploy troops instead of waiting for troops 
from member countries. This would save time and money and ensure effectiveness.  
Z. Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and 
Office of the Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect 
 
The office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities plays a 
pivotal role. The Office was first established by the former Secy. Gen. Kofi Annan as a response 
to the recent failures of the United Nations to take effective preventive action against 
genocide.235 The Special Adviser acts as a bridging link between massive and systematic 
violations of human rights and threats to international peace and security.236 In 2005 the heads of 
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the governments endorsed the mandate of the Special Adviser.237 Special Advisor’s appointment 
is viewed as an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in preventing 
genocide and similar crimes.238 The Special Adviser is instructed to “act as a mechanism of early 
warning to the Secy. Gen., and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention 
potential situations that could result in genocide.”239 
The Special Adviser's Mandate includes the following:240  
· To collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on 
massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of 
ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; 
· To act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the 
Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in 
genocide;  
· To make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on 
actions to prevent or halt genocide;  
· To liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and 
work to enhance the United Nations’ capacity to analyze and manage information 
regarding genocide or related crimes. 
· To seek and receive information relevant to the protection of genocide from all UN 
bodies, in particular early-warning information, and act as a catalyst within the UN 
system, making recommendations for effective prevention responses by the Secretary-
General, the Security Council, and other UN partners in a comprehensive system-wide 
process, and supporting these partners in undertaking preventive action in accordance 
with their mandates and responsibilities.  
The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide should be the focal point. Juan Mendez 
was the first Special Adviser. Presently, Francis Deng was appointed as the Special Adviser to 
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the Secy. Gen., Ban Ki Moon. With much controversy his mandate has been increased from 
genocide alone and included mass atrocities.  In order to implement his mandate, the Special 
Adviser works with an internal UN consultative group comprising of OCHA, UNDP, UNIFEM, 
DPKO, DPA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, and UNICEF.241 Deliberating his mandate, the Special 
Adviser has developed an Analysis Framework. The Analysis Framework comprises eight 
categories of factors that the OSAPG uses to determine whether there may be a risk of genocide 
in a given situation. The factors include: Inter group relations, including record of discrimination 
and/or other human rights violations committed against a group, Circumstances that affect the 
capacity to prevent genocide, Presence of arms and armed elements, Motivation of leading actors 
in the State/region; acts which serve to encourage divisions between national, racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups, Circumstances that facilitate the perpetration of genocide, Genocidal Acts, 
Evident to destroy in whole or in part, Triggering factors.242 
 
The need is that the different offices within the UN should cooperate with the Special 
Adviser. The Security Council should especially cooperate with him. Furthermore, if a UNSC 
Sub-Committee on R2P is created then that office should work in close collaboration with the 
office of the Special Adviser. 
 
The Secy. Gen. Ban Ki Moon appointed Edward C. Luck as the Special Adviser on 
Responsibility to Protect. His role primarily includes conceptual development and consensus 
building, to assist general assembly to continue consideration on this crucial issue.243 This clearly 
points out to the fact that the Special Adviser is more like an ambassador of R2P. He should 
adopt means to convince to adopt R2P at regional and national levels. He should participate in 
political dialogues at all levels. He shares equal burden along with the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide. He is the spokesperson of the Secy. Gen. on this issue. He should help 
countries understand the concept and build consensus on R2P and further lobby with the Security 
Council and respective governments to put R2P in to practice. His goal is to breed a culture of 
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responsibility among states and among other members of the UN and build the required political 
will.  
The whole machinery could work this way: The Office of the High Commissioner establishes 
an office for early warning mechanism, a preliminary analysis is done and the information is sent 
to the Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide, and to the Special Adviser on Responsibility 
to Protect. Both these office conclude their findings through their expert knowledge if the 
situation merits application of R2P. The information is then sent to the hypothetical Security 
Council Sub Committee on R2P.  Once the information is sent to the hypothetical committee, the 
two Special Advisers should take proactive role in informing the public and governments about 
the developing conflict. Assuming that the Sub Committee agrees with the analysis provided, the 
SC should invoke R2P and give respective directions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
R2P as stated earlier in this thesis is a novel concept. If invoked rightfully it could help us 
prevent genocides, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity. As Dorota Giercyz observes, 
“Genocides and crimes against humanity are considered crimes under all circumstances, whether 
in time of peace or war; neither immunities nor status of limitations apply; they fall under 
universal jurisdiction with an obligation of local trial or extradition; they involve increased 
international obligations on states to cooperate; and are not subject to amnesty.”244  
 
The concept of sovereignty is gradually being redefined and the R2P doctrine has made 
considerable contribution in this regard. As Kofi Annan notes, “State sovereignty, in its most 
basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-
operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and 
not vice versa.”245 Sovereignty entails responsibility. The R2P doctrine is a major achievement 
for human rights and should not be seen as a failure. Like much of contemporary international 
law it needs time to evolve to achieve its maximum potential.246 As an anonymous scholar has 
observed, “R2P reflects the ongoing transformation of traditional international law norms by 
enabling international law to address a moral imperative regardless of international borders. 
International Law is increasingly placing a greater responsibility on states with respect to the 
rights of citizens and even those outside a state’s territory and control.”247  
 
 The beauty in R2P lies in the fact it does not negate humanitarian intervention but 
maintains that it should be used as a last resort. Many scholars have opined that, howsoever it 
might be rejected, armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face 
of mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished. NATO’s action though considered 
illegal was determined to be legitimate. Protection of the human rights of the people 
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overpowered all other principles. Honoring Human Rights attained supreme primacy. Kofi 
Annan did not condemn NATO airstrikes outright. He rather posed an important challenge to the 
world community and the world summit in 2005 seems to have clarified the doubt. The countries 
have agreed that they have a sovereign responsibility. They once again agreed there is a watchdog 
called SC that can invoke the R2P principle and intervene in the state. R2P principle also works 
as blame and shame thing. When R2P is invoked it makes it clear that the offending country is 
indulging in serious human rights violations.  
 
It might seem that countries have matured enough to understand their rights and obligations. 
However, politics could be dirty business. R2P calls for an action against these dirty politics. It 
urges countries to unite together to curd these gross human rights violations. Adopting R2P, 
recognizing a nation’s sovereignty as responsibility, agreeing to the fact that with authority 
comes responsibility is in itself a great achievement. R2P must live and it must live long. There 
are efforts to kill this novel doctrine and we need to protect it by invoking in a rightful manner 
and by applying it to the crimes provided in the doctrine.  
 
One of the best ways to do this is that the Security Council with its vast powers and influence 
should actively adopt the measure of Preventive Diplomacy. Diplomacy helps and saves time, 
money and resources. The Council should also make it a point to use force as a last resort. The 
permanent members need to understand the major responsibility they shoulder. However, at the 
same time, they often do not wish to use their resources in countries that do not matter to them. 
This must not be the case. The Council should act in a uniform manner keeping the strategic 
interests of the permanent members aside. This could be a difficult goal but this is the only way. 
The Council should have complete analysis of the information and decide on the situation on a 
case by case basis. It should function as global police.  
 
Another option is to get a grip of its resolutions. The problem, as many have seen, is that 
after it authorizes a resolution, the Council leaves it to the countries or regional forces concerned 
for action. The need is for the Security Council to be completely involved without losing a grip 
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of the situation. The Council should make its objective precise and clear during authorization, it 
should also limit the duration of such authorization in order to avoid the abuse of its resolutions. 
It should require the member states concerned to report more extensively and more frequently on 
how the authorized operation is carried out. Once it gets a clear signal from the UN bodies and 
the hypothetical sub-committee, the Council should take effective preventive measures by 
facilitating dialogue between the concerned parties. The Council should make itself more clear.  
 
The Council should cooperate and work in coalition with the Secy. General, the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass atrocities, the Special Adviser on 
Responsibility to Protect, and the Commissioner on Human Rights. The Council is expected to 
play a pivotal and more proactive role. The Council also needs to work in a transparent manner. 
In the current world order there is no alternative but to make the Council more efficient. If the 
Council does not work at most pressing times, a critical evaluation of the Council’s work should 
be undertaken.  
 
However, events unfolding in Darfur confirm that geo-politics play an important role. 
Countries are concerned about their own material and strategic interests and political power, 
even though millions might be losing their lives. History proves that superpowers are more likely 
to react when there is a direct threat to their interests, but if the situation does not threaten them, 
they might act but at a snail’s pace. There is an urgent need to help many people in places like 
Darfur where many women and young girls are being targeted and raped, and the state is clearly 
guilty of being complicit in such crimes. R2P provides the international community a powerful 
compelling argument for proactive involvement.  
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